1: Garnett B-4, 5 (ca.1880) 1891
MA11 Kurd MA11

elders having great weight, and, as I shall subsequently point out, even the women are not excluded from a share in the politics of the tribe.

Though more or less dominated by the numerous conquerors who have successively, for three thousand years, overrun those regions which are now called Kūrdistan, the Kūrds have never ceased to own a distinct nationality. Since the Ottoman conquest they have been constantly wavering between the two rival powers of Islam—the Sunnis and the Shias, as represented by the Turks and the Persians respectively, siding, according to the exigencies of the time, now with one party and now with the other. Notwithstanding their sufferings in the destructive wars of conquest waged for centuries by Turk and Persian, and the constant internal feuds fomented by both those nations in order to weaken the power of the Kūrdish warriors, they still maintain a sort of semi-independence, preserving their nationality as distinct from that of their neighbours as in earlier days, though possessing no dynasty, political constitution, ancient religion, historical traditions, or literature, to bind them together.

Three times during the present century have national aspirations incited them to throw off the Turkish yoke; but owing to the immense extent of mountainous country over which they are scattered, their successes have been but partial and nugatory. Representatives as they probably are of the ancient Chaldeans, no other race has, perhaps, so long preserved its nationality under conditions so unfavourable.

1: Garnett B-4, 5 (ca. 1880) 1891
MA11 Kurd MA11
Yazidis MH10

K 775 776

Besides the *djins* and other magical beings, in whose existence the Kūrds, in common with their neighbours of other races, implicitly believe, another class of uncanny visitants, called *sheyts*, excites the awe and dread of these mountain people. These are the apparitions—I will not say ghosts, for, like all Oriental *revenants*, they rise in the body—of martyrs, *i.e.*, Moslems who have died fighting for Islam, and at whose tombs, as at those of Dervish Sheikhs, miracles are believed to be wrought. When they rise from their graves and appear to mortals, which they are said occasionally to do in crowds, it is looked upon as a sign of some important coming event. The Kūrds appear, too, to credit them with habits similar to their own, and look upon them as a kind of fluctuating population, as nomadic as themselves.

Y 101

The Yezidis, or "Devil-worshippers," whom I have already mentioned as observing marriage and funeral rites differing from those of the Moslem Kūrds, form eight or nine separate tribes, some nomad, some sedentary. The execration in which they are held by Moslems has led to the identification of the supposed founder of the sect with Yezd, the slayer of Hassan and Hussein, the grandsons of the Prophet and martyrs *par excellence* of Islam. This name they, however, no doubt bore long anterior to the seventh century, *Yezd* being one of the titles applied by the ancient Persians to the Supreme Being. The name of Sheikh Adi, a mythical saint, to whom their chief temple is nominally dedicated, is derived, by Mr. Badger,[1] from the Hebrew *Adh* or *Ad*, the two

K [184]

Y 776 101

[1] *The Nestorians, &c.*

One of the advantages of appointment in this fashion 648
is that it permits the central government to provide
properly qualified officials, responsible to higher authority,
rather than relegate their selection to the whim of the
voter. On the other hand, the official appointed in
Baghdad almost always comes from a different town, and
usually from a different province, than that to which he is
assigned. Moreover, although there is no bar to any person
rising in the government, the old middle and upper-class
Turkish and Arab families of Iraq, who furnished officers
and officials to the Ottoman cadre, tend to dominate the
ranks of the new monarchy as the wealthy, educated class.
Thus, because there is little immediate community of 648
interest between governor and governed, there is the poten- 662
tiality of the use of office for the furtherance of personal
ends on a local level, and, on the higher levels in Baghdad
itself, the acquisition of government positions by the in-
fluence of family or wealth. None of these things, how-
ever, should in any way be construed as an accusation of
dereliction, particularly in the administration of the
Rowanduz district, but even the possibility of malfeasance
has an easily imaginable effect on a people as nationally [186]
sensitive as the Kurds. Of more cogent importance, however,
is the fact that the administration of Rowanduz lies in
the hands of persons on the whole alien to the community
itself, and the social implications of the presence of
this new class shall be examined in some detail.

At the head of the executive branch of government, subject, of course, to legislative or royal check, are the ministers, from whose various departments all public officers are appointed. Following in general the old Ottoman lines, the country is divided into fourteen liwas, each under a mutasarif. The liwa is subdivided into qadhas, each under a qaimmaqam. The qadha is in turn subdivided into a number of nahiyas, each under a mudir. Large towns have a rais beladiya appointed by the government whose office is responsible for the intricacies of metropolitan administration. The people have a mukhtar, selected from the local inhabitants, who, while in no sense a public official, acts in liason between his fellows and the mudir, a role exactly comparable to that of the 'umda in contemporary Egypt.[1]

631. 648 [622]

The qadha or district of Rowanduz belongs to the Erbil liwa, and is subdivided into five nahiyas. The sedentary population of these, as well as the number of villages, is listed here for 1950, as furnished by the census officer of Rowanduz. In spite of this official's labors in reducing a difficult problem, it is necessary to regard these figures with some reservation, for the Kurds, like many of their contemporaries in the Middle East and like the Israelites of old, regard inquiries into their numbers with the strongest suspicion. Similarly, the "village" here referred to may vary from a few isolated

631 162 361 [186]

[1] Ayrout, 1945, pp. 47-48.

there are many malingerers. The legal remedy for evasion, whenever detected, is simply the extension of the term of duty. There are, to be sure, many Kurds of middle and upper-class families who, on the completion of their secondary schooling, select the not unpleasant and honorable career of an army officer. 702 [687] [565]

For the people of the district the serai, with its important complement of officials, its bustling crowd during hours of business, its guards, and its four-colored ensign fluttering above from a flagpole, is the physical symbol of governmental authority. "The serai prefers this," or "the serai would never permit that," is heard in popular speech. But for many it is a place, neither of prestige nor yet of oppression, but of sorrow, for in lorries drawn up before its gateway depart the groups of recruits and prisoners bound for Erbil, and the people know that many will never return. There is always a number of women to be found outside the serai, old and young, mothers and wives, dressed in the stained, dark cloth of the countryside, and often one will raise her voice in a low-pitched lament or fall into tears. An enterprising Nestorian has set up an antique camera at one corner, and the prisoner and recruit often exchange photographs with their wives, the poorly-made prints that are so often brought out during the long months of separation. [344] [186] [208] [152] [215]

To one side of the serai, on one of the two streets leading up into the town, is a small, square brick building 344 232 654

roadside <u>shaykhana</u> between Kawlokan and the barracks. With the reputations of their daughters in mind, the townspeople of Rowanduz keep the enlisted personnel of the army at some distance, and, because the army has greater freedom in Kawlokan, describe its population, perhaps a hundred in all, as being wholly made up of "prostitutes and procurers." There seems to be no truth in the accusation. In addition, they do not tolerate arrack-drinking by enlisted men in Rowanduz. The story is often told how several years ago a soldier managed to become intoxicated while in town and made loud and unseemly remarks in a <u>shaykhana</u>. He was thrown into the gorge, and, in the inquiry into his death, the townspeople asserted that, while drunk, he claimed "he was able to fly," and that they knew nothing of the matter beyond this.

There are, at times, government agents of other departments at work in the district, for example, those of the Directorate-General of Agriculture, but their connections are with Erbil or Baghdad, rather than with Rowanduz itself. Some of the most important of these are the engineers of the department charged with public works, for they utilize local labor in their constructions. In the summer of 1951 one such engineer was engaged in resurfacing the road between Rowanduz and Jiadian, and some fifty men from Rowanduz and the district were employed in this work. There are any number of others, such as repairmen for the telephone and telegraph lines, who frequent the area.

appear frequently in the town, for they are virtually assured of a sale. Poultry are not merchandized by any specific persons, because almost every house possesses a number of chickens or ducks, and any person who does not have his own makes a purchase by sending out a call into the neighborhood. The only turkey in the town, a huge bird, was kept by a police sergeant, and people wondered for what magnificent occasion it was being reserved. The sergeant, queried on the point, was uncertain himself, stating that his wife and servant had grown rather fond of the bird because of its notoriety. Dairy products such as milk, mast, and cheese, together with eggs, fruits, and vegetables, are brought daily to the town by villagers, arriving early in the morning and selling their produce to merchants or at the doors of houses. A large proportion of this trade is handled by the women of Balikian, a nearby agricultural village on the main road, and early every morning a number of them make the journey up to Rowanduz, their wares slung over their backs in shawls. They are a feature of life in the bazar, and spend an hour or two after their business is concluded gathered about its shops, sometimes purchasing a few trinkets or the requirements of their homes. They are unveiled, like most village women of the lower class, and, interestingly, are vilified one and all by the townspeople as prostitutes. It is supposed that they sell other things in addition to mast and cheese, and the "half dinar egg" (an impossible price

443 [223] [235]

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for an egg alone) is a notorious commodity. The army officers are believed to visit their village regularly, and all of its inhabitants are held to suffer from "the Russian sickness," a souvenir of the Czarist army. The investigator's interpreter carried on some scandalous conversations with some of these girls until they were driven away by the house-owner, but whether there was serious intention or simply the earthy banter of peasant women is hard to decide. In Egypt it is possible to hear daily such exchanges between fellahin men and women without the slightest possibility of realization. Inasmuch as Balikian has its husbands and sons, it is impossible to believe that any significant proportion of its female population is so engaged, despite the verdict of the Rowanduzis and the wild boasts of the younger army officers.

If there is any occupation in the town which carries with it the double stigma of being at once menial and dirty, it is that of the roasters of meat or kababchis. The kababchi, always in some state of undress and blackened with the smoke of his fire, is hence often of a surly and resentful temperament, and a number of stories, by no means confined to the Kurds, confirm this character. The kababchi works in close liaison with the butcher, from whom he obtains his meat, and, like the butcher, works according to order. Two confine their operations to their houses, while the third maintains a smoke-blackened booth in the bazar. The meat is prepared in two ways, either finely

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Attention might be directed to the land of Rowanduz itself. Before the Russians burned the old town, the present site above the valley was occupied by only a few Ottoman buildings, summer residences, and gardens. Most of the choicest lands in the new town are owned by Lali Khan and Ra'uf Effendi whose families had titles from Ottoman times. In the lower priced lands of the modern upper town there is a variety of tenure, government (amiriya), private (tapu), and religious endowment (waqf), but the two most important owners are those mentioned here.

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It is somewhat unfortunate, in treating the economies of the Rowanduz district and the position of its principal town within such a system, to be unable to present an exact quantitative analysis. In the absence of government statistics, and faced with the widespread distrust of the populace toward inquiries which might bear some relation to taxation, one must be satisfied with a generalized description of a primary nature. This need not be regarded as a deficit, inasmuch as the more important conclusions of this study have reference to social structure, an emphasis, however, which in no wise implies that the economic background is not critically germane to the discussion. It is therefore possible, in closing this section, to re-emphasize certain generalities which statistical information would not seem likely to modify in any serious fashion.

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The size and importance of any town can be governed by a number of things, environmental, economic, social, or religious.

also imports, but their fringes must be prepared by local 291
seamstresses. Folded diagonally and rolled, the scarves are bound around the head one next to the other, and one or more of the ends usually hang down to the shoulders. The cap is of white crocheted cloth and decorated with simple patterns in variously coloured thread, sometimes of gilt or silver. The scarves are characteristically an open black and white print, the same as used in the shafiya or head-cloth of the Arabs to the south, although some are a solid grey or black. The green turban which indicates a descendant of the tribe of the Prophet is worn in the same way, but is infrequently encountered. Only one man in Rowandus, an elderly blacksmith of humble station, appeared in it regularly. The tarbush, the red felt Turkish "fez," 292
has a limited and curious survival in Iraq, among the imams 186
or priests of the Shiite (Muslim) faith and Jewish money-changers. It is never seen in the town. A peculiar type of woolen cap, with a cloth bill in front, a round tassel on top, and a loose hanging which falls over the back of the neck, is found occasionally, affected by chieftains and their bodyguards. It is a peculiarity of a mountain tribal group, the Skikak. In the Rowandus district it is taken to indicate a pugnacious or formidable character. It is difficult to decide on its origins. There is an old and 183
extremely widespread prejudice throughout the Islamic world 291
against headgear with brims or bills "because they do not permit the wearer to touch his forehead to the ground in prayer."

AY

any officer may wear his master's cast-off uniform 291
trousers, the servant of an official a frayed shirt or
sweater bestowed on him, and so on. On the other hand, a
civil official or officer, aside from a few lounging items
used privately, never appears in the "national dress" of a
Kurd or an Arab, even in part. The Arabic adjective baladi 186
(from balad, "town" or "municipality") is met here for the 291
first time, referring to a "true countryman" in the same 554
connotation as echt deutsch in German, but with an extremely
derogatory meaning. An Iraqi who follows a career as an
official or an officer has entered a higher class of
society, and to misunderstand his new status by wearing,
say, a skullcap, a turban, or the Arab headdress, would
expose him to ridicule as a "rustic," baladi, who has no
understanding of urban manners. This is particularly true [668]
of a Kurdish official, for such attire might be inter-
preted as symptomatic of nationalistic, and hence revolu-
tionary, leanings. While the older aristocracy, the Arab
and Kurdish chieftains wear the costumes of their people
as a matter of course, there is no democracy of clothing
as far as the government service and the governed are
concerned.

Most of the men of the district are armed and appear 411
frequently in public carrying weapons, particularly the
chieftains and their bodyguards. The simplest and most
widespread is the khunjir or dagger which is a curved
blade of steel, sharpened on both edges, with a raised
central rib. The hilt, without the protection of a guard,

white cotton trousers and shirts, similar to the under- 291
garments of adults, and the students like to add a cloth European jacket. The dress of the children of officials and officers is much like that of their Kurdish playfellows, at the same time more European in character, particularly for the boys who sometimes wear slacks and jackets. Almost all of the youth go barefoot a large part of the time, although sandals or shoes appear in the winter, usually without stockings. The infants and [854]
younger children are confined to the houses in extremely cold weather, and the problem for them does not exist. There is no specific time at which a youth or a maiden must put on adult attire. In the case of a girl, the parents insist on the veil whenever they feel the neighbors "might talk" if it was not worn. For the boys, the adulation of weapons has already been noticed, and is coupled with a similar feeling toward the clothing of chieftains and their bodyguards, warriors full-blown in the eyes of adolescence. Hence the mother is under considerable pressure to influence the father for money to deck out his son in adult clothing. The young Kurd who 18 291
follows a government career in the secondary schools and colleges of the cities soon learns to sublimate such notions to the condemning adjective _haladi_, "rustic," although he may retain a certain admiration for the dashing garb of the heroes of his youth.

A Kurdish townsman usually washes his hands and face 515
at least once or twice each day. One of the ceremonials of 264

The heads of the men are not shaven, but the hair is 302
cropped close to the skull by the barber, a tonsure resembling that of a European or American army recruit. The face is shaven clean, save the moustache which has great social significance as a sign of masculinity. A man without some sort of stubble on his upper lip is in danger of 302 891
being reputed "not quite a man" among both the men and, more injurious to vanity, the women. Indeed, the moustache, through an understandable cultural process, has come to be a necessary attribute of virile beauty, and a person with a luxuriant growth, though destitute of other physical qualities, may be regarded as handsome by the women. Even officials and officers, who often wear their hair long, do not shave the upper lip. A full beard is worn by only 302
a few elderly men in the town, and is interpreted as a sign of both age and piety. Never, in recent years, is the beard, when white or grey, stained with henna, and this usage, ordinary in southern Iraq, is vilified as [186]
"Persian" and "Shiite" with the greatest of scorn. Townsmen are also supposed to shave the hair under the arms and around the genitals, although it is again difficult to say to what extent the custom is followed, for it is a [834]
great disgrace for a man to be seen naked by others. Except for the cologne of the barber, men do not use cosmetics or perfumes. In this connection, however, one 517
might mention the usage, in spring, of inhaling the 824
fragrance of cut blossoms. Characteristically, a host 574

2: Masters E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz
Iraq MH1

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K 186 563 779

suffered. Of the non-Muslims, the Jews might be mentioned first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli war, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have already migrated to their new country. The departure of the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who come from the Western world, and those who are native to the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The military prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are recognized, and almost any male from these countries is ipso facto an effendi or gentleman. The Briton, because of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldeans, Greeks, and Nestorians, who have been Islamic subjects in the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce, and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians in the cities, as cheats and thieves. The Chaldeans and the Nestorians, most of the latter displaced from their homeland in Turkey after the first World War, were once exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful folk, were not considered particularly different from Muslim peasants. Kurdish chieftains and their men have been invited to Nestorian festivals and there has been

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K 186 563
K [571]

considerable social intercourse between the two groups. 186
Unfortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq, 563
took service with the British, particularly in the infantry 571
levy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in
crushing two Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled
in the Rowanduz area, at Batas, Dara Harir and Dyana, and,
while outwardly amicable, the Kurds feel toward them a
certain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance
with the British, especially in the lucrative occupations
of the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, [167]
the Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as
are able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native [582]
group are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of
their daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them.
One can find Muslims in Baghdad with American, British, or
German wives, but never Armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. 627
Muslim girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim 837
woman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent 548
danger of being slain by their relatives, and the Baghdad
press is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of [553]
them assume Christian names, often of a cinema favorite,
and wear a cross conspicuously at the throat, changing
outwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam 771
commands tremendous respect from its followers and is a 578
"proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A
Muslim may be cursed by a non-Muslim to a certain point,

Iraq the Sunna is represented by most of the Arab groups, 795
the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans. The conflict be- 779
tween the two, often with violent political expressions, is 175
much the same as that between Catholic and Protestant in [578]
Germany, although there is little analogy in the type of religious content. The governing class in Iraq, deriving from Ottoman times, is about half Sunnite, and the dis- 795
session is often phrased along ethnic lines, Arab and Turk 186
against Arab and Persian. Certain practices, such as [302]
staining the beard with henna, are condemned by the Kurds alternatively as Shiite or Iranian. Curiously, they despise clitorectomy, in the Middle East purely Arabic and [304]
Negroid, as Farsi, "Persian," despite the fact that the practice seems to have no record in that country. One might suppose, particularly in view of the growth of pan-Islamic movements in recent years, that this distinction between Sunnite and Shiite was falling into decay. At a gathering in Rowanduz the investigator, on being informed by an army officer that he came from the southern provinces, innocently inquired if he belonged to the Shi'ah. When the officer replied seriously in the affirmative, there was a burst of laughter and derision from his fellow officers and officials, a matter of no little embarrassment. Save on [582]
the highest levels of society, there are few marriages between Sunnite and Shiite families.

The third division is on ethnic or national lines, 563
which, aside from foreigners and non-Muslims, separates

Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, and Turks. There are Persian 563
minorities in the cities of central and southern Iraq, but they fall under the religious classification of Shi'ah and there seems to be no conflict between them and Arabs of their own persuasion. The Turks are few in number and are concentrated in the middle and upper classes. In the days before the liberation of Iraq, there was bitter enmity toward the Turks as the representatives of Ottoman rule, but this has disappeared in recent years and there is no restriction, as, indeed, there never was, on marriage between members of this class and Sunnite Muslims, Arabs and Kurds, of comparable status. [582] A survey of the lists of officials and army officers reveals the remarkable extent to which the survivors of Ottoman rule have retained their position in the government service. The Turkomans are gathered in central and northeastern Iraq, mainly about Altun Keupri and Koi Sanjaq, and have been unspectacular in national affairs, largely farmers and shepherds, a remnant of the famous Horde of the White Sheep. [582] Again, there appears to be no restriction on marriage with Sunnite Muslims, but there is little reason for an Arab, Kurd, or Turk of the upper classes to take an illiterate, impoverished bride from among them.

The matter of Arab and Kurd is quite otherwise, for 186
in the case of the latter there is a well-armed minority 648
population, Muslims, and hence free of the susceptibilities 101
of religious attack, with a strong base in agriculture and animal husbandry. They are estimated at 400,000 persons,

and representatives of the same nation, totalling several millions, are hard by in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. There is some cause for apprehension as there have been no less than six armed Kurdish rebellions, some common to several of the four governments involved and quelled with difficulty, in the past twenty-five years. As in the case of most of the population, the royal family of Iraq is Arab and the language of government is Arabic. The spectre of Kurdish nationalism strikes terror in the hearts of government officials, and there is little love lost between Arab and Kurd. Many of the Kurds regard the Arabs as unlawful rulers, at the same time scorning them for the poverty and filth to be found in southern Iraq. "Are you an Arab?" a Kurdish man or woman often challenges a dirty child of the village, "Go wash yourself." On their part, the Arabs, particularly those of the upper classes, following the tradition of Xenephon, regard the Kurds with a mixture of fear and disgust. "Why do you waste your time with those people?" the investigator was asked by an Arab official, "they are all bandits." In spite of these things, there is no bar to intermarriage between the two groups, and any Kurd can rise to great prominence in the government service, although he is a priori under suspicion. In 1951 two of the fourteen provinces in Iraq were directed by Kurdish governors, and the command of the army unit at Rowanduz was for a time given to a Kurdish staff officer.

In addition, there is a certain amount of rivalry between persons of different provinces or cities, for

example, an Arab of Mosul and one of Baghdad, but it does not appear to be of a serious nature. Among the Kurds, one can often hear the native of a certain locale praising it to the exclusion of others. "The preparation of rice at Sulaymaniya is the best," a Kurd of this city proclaims in a discussion of cookery, but feelings of this type do not operate to separate the people in any important way, because religious and ethnic divisions have much greater weight. On the other hand, tribal allegiance in certain rural areas has great importance, although increased government control in matters such as the vendetta has mitigated their character to some extent. It is difficult to formulate any general rules for tribal exogamy or endogamy, because the chieftains often intermarry with aristocratic houses of the same standing, regardless of tribe. The tendency among most tribesmen, Kurd or Arab, is toward marriage within their own group, because the preferential match is between cousins.

In the other divisions of society, two parallel systems, at many points intermingled, are to be found. In the first of these there is a simple division between a hereditary aristocracy and a mass of commoners and this system is primitive or quasi-primitive. Save for Kurdistan and certain areas held by groups such as the Chaldaeans, the Mandaeans, or the Yezidis, much of Iraq has been partitioned for centuries among Arab tribes. The chieftains of these tribes and their subdivisions are aristocrats who inherit their position in the paternal

conomic wealth has been cut from beneath them. In an ideal situation, they may survive only as landowners and as they are able to obtain positions in the government. The situation, however, is far from ideal, and in practice may continue as their forebears, side by side with the new competitors. It cannot be denied that they accord the government considerable aid in the maintenance of order, and, at the same time, provide it with great anxiety in their private warfare and political thought. 565 [178]

This Kurdish aristocracy is by no means feeble in the face of such competition, and has the advantage of popular support and sympathy, particularly, as has been seen, because it represents a highly idealized group. It has been said that the Kurds are easy prey to doctrinaire philosophies, specifically Communism, but among them, save a certain of the well-educated, there is no knowledge or idea of what may be called a "class struggle," or, in older terms, the rich or priveleged against the poor. The struggle is strictly between Kurdish society as a whole and what they consider an alien system. The investigator has talked at length with a number of dissatisfied Kurdish youths, as well as others in whom such sentiments might be expected, and has heard much of "good" chieftains and "bad" chieftains, but never the aristocracy condemned as such. It must not be thought that the speech of this aristocratic group is "reactionary," in the sense of opposition to modern innovations and the desire to return to older ways. Such things as automobiles, modern firearms, wirelesses, and 565 668 177 186

any technical device within their means have been assimilated with alacrity. European and American medical goods are eagerly sought, and there is almost a childlike faith in the wonders of the Western World. "We can," said an aghā, "make of this area a Switzerland of the Middle East." The less well-informed, whose knowledge only extends to the Mediterranean, say the same thing, having reference to Lebanon. Insofar as family life is concerned, the Kurds, comparing themselves to the Arabs, point with pride to their "more enlightened" treatment of women in terms of the veil and social intercourse, but one is dubious of any wider extent of this liberality. In short, the Kurdish aristocracy represents an extremely active class, untroubled by most aspects of Westernization, but weakened by their own dissentions and threatened by the encroachment of a new government. It seems impossible, in view of so many variables, to predict whether or not they will be able to maintain their integrity.

Inasmuch as they represent the first system in which the only significant division is between aristocrat and commoner, the Kurdish chieftains of the Rowanduz area are often uneducated and wear the national costume as it has been described in the preceding section. Only a moderate number from this group have obtained higher education and have subsequently entered the government service. Many, indeed, are illiterate and have no knowledge of Arabic, the language of the government. In Rowanduz only three aristocratic houses are represented, those of Isma'il

In treating the class made up of officials and officers, certain things from the initial discussion in this section may be seen. The first of these are the religious and ethnic divisions. Calling to mind the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, a number of Christians are to be found in the official class in Rowandus, for example, the postmaster and several of the teachers. Because of their religion, these men are at some disadvantage among their colleagues. At a gathering to which one or more Christians have been invited, they may be embarrassed whenever religious matters are discussed and are generally limited in the forcefulness of their words, for they are unable to argue with the fluency of expression permissable between fellow Muslims. A Christian teacher cannot castigate his pupils with the freedom of some other, often to his chagrin, for the students are aware of his social inferiority. Similarly, an occurrence of the distinction between Sunnite and Shiite in this class has been noticed. Of greater importance, however, is the division along national lines between the government class and the two other groups to be found in the town. Both the landed aristocracy and the townspeople are ethnically homogeneous, while the official class is diverse in its members, made up of Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, with the first group providing the greatest numbers. The Turks are little troubled, but a Kurdish civil servant must be circumspect in his conduct and exercise some care that he does not exhibit what might be interpreted as revolutionary sentiments or behavior.

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behavior. The ethnic barrier between the Arab officials and the local inhabitants is by far the most striking. Divisions along lines of locale or tribe have little or no significance for members of the official class, although many of them, especially the Arabs, may belong to the latter type of group, in addition to their local origin. There is a certain amount of banter between natives of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, or other cities, just as in America much is heard of the rivalry of various cities and states, but it does not operate in any serious way to divide the group. The force connected with tribal affiliations in Iraq appears to be only appropriate in its proper setting, and a pair of officials, members of two tribes engaged in a deadly feud in some rural area, seem to make nothing of it divorced from the actual scene.

Something of the relations of the official class to the aristocracy and the townspeople has already been indicated. While a number of the Kurds may regard the government in a poor light, it would be a mistake to assume that they do not have admiration or fondness for certain of the officials. Conversely, it would be equally erroneous to think that many of the officials do not have a paternal affection for their charges. Nevertheless, the whole theory of personal relations between officials and townspeople is based on the thesis that "familiarity breeds contempt," which has a certain amount of validity. An over-friendly mudir might be looked upon with more suspicion and distrust than one who was comfortably distant. Thus the more

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Rowanduz, as a minor administrative and mercantile center, stands almost midway between the agricultural village and the great city. Its populace is divided into three groups, the Kurdish aristocrats, the townsmen, and the official class. It is here, rather than in the villages, that the displacement of the aristocracy is more clearly in evidence. In Ottoman times the divisions of society were stabilized. There was little motive or means for the son of a townsman to become a civil servant, although this occasionally took place, and it was impossible, as it still is, to become an aristocrat. The addition of the officials and officers of modern Iraq, a "new elite," and, in particular, the institution of schools which makes [557] entrance possible, has radically altered this arrangement. It is now theoretically within the reach of any townsman to have a son enter the ranks of the official class, and it is for this reason that they insist so avidly on the education of their heirs, placing high hopes on their success in the schools. Strictly speaking, the society of the town is disjointed, for the townsmen continue to [186] regard the official class as alien, and have adopted little of their dress and manners. On the other hand, they have been quick to realize that the new system offers an opportunity for social advancement and are eager for their [557] children to take advantage of it. In short, the townspeople have been absorbed into the second system, although the first continues to operate elsewhere in the district,

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

timate capacity of 150,000 Kw.) is to be completed in 1958 at Dibis on the Little Zab to serve all northern Iraq.

Two of the most widely advertized major projects of the development programme, the great dams at Dukan on the Little Zab and Darband-i Khan on the Sirwan, are located in Kurdistan and are bringing some temporary benefit to the neighbourhood in the form of wages for labour. But their purpose is first and foremost the protection of Baghdad from flood, and the secondary benefits from storage of water will accrue to the lands down stream. Up stream considerable areas of agricultural land will be submerged and many villages are doomed to destruction. The government is understood to be fully alive to the necessity of tackling the delicate problem of compensating and finding new land for the dispossessed cultivators with foresight and generosity, and of balancing these large spectacular works with lesser projects in the upland valleys which will be of more direct and permanent value to the local people. Failure in this regard might well lead to unrest.

III.

The Kurds have not remained unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism that has swept over the countries of the Middle East since the turn of the century; and to understand the attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government of Baghdad we must cast a brief glance backwards over the history of the region both before and after 1918.

In spite of the centralizing policies of the Ottoman and Persian governments a number of quasi-autonomous Kurdish principalities survived in both countries until about the middle of the 19th century. Two of the princely families are intimately connected with the development of Kurdish nationalism: the Badr Khans of Bohtan (still in Turkey) with their capital at Jazirat ibn Umar (now Cizre), and the Babans of Sulaimani. It is not easy to fix on any particular date or circumstance as marking the beginning, or even a turning point, in the development of Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. Throughout the 19th century, both before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were of course frequent revolts against the central authority in which the leaders did not fail to appeal to racial sentiment in order to rally their followers. Modern nationalism, unlike earlier manifestations of a similar spirit, tend to attach tremendous importance to language. It would be tempting then to suggest that some particular significance attached to the year 1892, when members of the Badr Khan family began the publication of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*, numbers of which appeared at intervals until 1902 in towns as far apart as Cairo, London and (of all unlikely places) Folkestone, England. But in 1892 Hajji Qadir of Koi (*circa* 1817-1894),

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

stable, and official administration, directed from Baghdad, grew in scope and progessively enlarged its area of effective control.

Such then is the background of the villages where the following material was collected. They are primarily tenant villages in the Suleimani valley, or villages dominated by freeholding Hamawand farmers. However, certain aspects of local social structure become clear only by comparison with other situations — particularly those found in the *Jaf* areas — or by historical comparisons and deductions. The data on Jaf organization was obtained from a limited number of informants on short visits to various villages. For historical material, C. J. Rich's accounts (op.cit) have been found most useful.

I have tried to avoid bringing conditions and factors in the towns of Suleimani, Chemchemal, Halebja, etc. into the picture. The numerous «Western» influences in these centers are extremely complicated and difficult to evaluate. In the intricacies of the class and near-caste system, differential contacts and reactions due to sub-cultures are indeed complex. The rural areas, on the other hand, show greater uniformity in patterns: the tribal areas are organized and separable, and the tenant villagers, in their small, endogamous communities, have strong patterns of localism and traditionalism. There is a popular story illustrating this localism: A donkey belonging to one of the tenant farmers in a village ran away; so the farmer followed it, to catch it. The donkey climbed up the hillside, far away from the village, but the farmer did not want to lose it. So he followed it high up into the mountains, never turning, and finally close to the mountain top he caught it. On turning around he saw below him the whole beautiful Shahr-i-zur plain, in which his own village lay. The peasant gasped and exclaimed: «I never knew the world was so vast!»

What goes on in the towns belongs, as far as most villagers are concerned, to a quite separate world, and it seemed both in the field and in working up the notes valid to separate off the Kurdish *countryside* as the area of study. But due to diversity even in this area, any attempt at giving a conventional anthropological description of «the culture» of «the society» must fail. Each of the compact, widely separated little villages shows characteristics of its own, local

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
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THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD

Archie Roosevelt, Jr.

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THE DREAM of Kurdish nationalists, an independent Kurdistan, was realized on a miniature scale in Iran from December 1945 to December 1946. The origin of the little Kurdish Republic, its brief and stormy history, and its sudden collapse is one of the more illuminating stories of the contemporary Middle East. Its strangely discordant themes of tribal warfare, rival imperialisms and social systems, medieval chivalry and idealistic nationalism well illustrate the complexity of the Kurdish picture, involving as it does a people never united and now split among five nations, none of which is sympathetic to Kurdish nationalist aspirations.

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v ARCHIE ROOSEVELT, JR., served as Assistant Military Attaché in Tehran from March 1946 to February 1947. During this period he made a special study of the Kurdish situation and was one of four Americans to visit Mahabad during the brief existence of the Kurdish Republic.

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FORMATION OF THE KOMALA

186 609 668 It was in this town of Mahabad, left to its own devices by the Allies, that the most recent of the Kurdish nationalist movements was born. On August 16, 1943, a dozen young Kurds, most of them small merchants and petty officials of the town, founded the Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd, or "Committee of Kurdish Youth." For purposes of secrecy, the membership of the new party was kept below 100 and was organized in cells; the semi-weekly meetings were never held in the same house twice in succession. The Constitution of the Komala was strongly nationalist and membership was restricted to persons of Kurdish descent on both sides of the family, the only exception being for those with an Assyrian mother — an indication of the present close relations between Kurds and Assyrians.

The Komala spread rapidly, not only in Iran but in other countries as well, where Kurds saw in the new group a more vigorous force than in the traditional Kurdish nationalist parties. Chapters of the Komala were founded in the Iraqi towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, Suleimania, Rowanduz, and Shaklawa; and there was a chapter functioning even in Turkey, where Kurdish nationalist activity is an offense punishable by death. The chiefs of the tribes in the vicinity of Mahabad also sent emissaries offering help. They were told that they were not needed then, but might be called on in the future.

177 668 It was inevitable that the two great powers primarily interested in the area should eventually hear of the Komala. The British, whose Kirkuk oil fields are located in Kurdish country, kept a watchful eye on developments. Their political adviser in Mosul sometimes ranged as far as Mahabad, while his subordinates were stationed in Rowanduz, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Suleimania. Yet the British could not encourage Kurdish aspirations without arousing Arab resentment, and so remained deaf to the overtures of the Kurdish nationalists.

SOVIET INFILTRATION

With the Soviets it was a different story. At first they were evidently unprepared for active work among the Kurds, although

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
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177 668 they did once, in 1942, invite the leading aghas to Baku. In the spring of that year, when the Kurds raided some villages west of Lake Urmieh, the Soviets even brought back the Iranian army and gendarmerie (though they rendered their possible services ineffective by constant interference). Yet the Soviets eventually realized the potentialities of the situation. The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered around the Soviet Consulate in Rezaieh, attached to which was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known as "Captain Jafarov," who wandered freely among the tribesmen and villagers in Kurdish dress.

Soviet activity in Mahabad dates from the time two of these agents, known as "Abdullahov" and "Hajiov," appeared, ostensibly to buy horses for the Red Army. Apparently a chance encounter first brought them into contact with the Kurdish nationalist movement. The story is that Abdullahov met a man [578] dressed in Kurdish costume in an Armenian wine-shop in Mahabad and complimented him on wearing the national dress.[1] This attention aroused the interest of the Kurd, who happened to be one of the founders of the Komala. They fell into conversation, and finally the Kurd asked whether the Soviets would furnish arms if the Kurds were to form a nationalist party. Abdullahov parried with the question, "Who are you afraid of?" The Kurd said that they feared only their own khans. Abdullahov replied with an expression of contempt for the khans; the Kurd then brought him to a private home where he introduced him to the other leaders of the Komala. Further contacts with Soviet authorities were arranged and one of the Komala leaders who knew Russian became the party's liaison officer. From that time, although the party program called for appeals to each of the Big

[1] Kurdish dress consists of a tasseled turban of blue silk, embroidered vest, baggy grey pants of homespun wool, and a huge crimson kammerband, intricately knotted in front, from which protrudes a pipe, the top of a tobacco pouch, and a long, curved dagger. The Kurds, like other Iranians forced to abandon their native dress by Reza Shah, kept their clothes hidden in their homes, a symbol of their national pride, until the Allied invasion, when they suddenly blossomed out in them. Indeed, the tribesmen, safe in their mountains, had never really abandoned them. The Kurds are incorrigible dandies and a poor man among them would rather spend his last coins on a fine *kalah* than on a good *kabab*. Reza Shah's restrictions on their dress had served to make him and his regime all the more hated.

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177 668 Three impartially, the Komala moved inevitably into the Soviet orbit.

During this period VOKS, the Soviet international propaganda organization, was starting a number of "Iranian-Soviet Cultural Relations Societies" in all sections of Iran. As the Komala had grown too big to continue meeting in private homes, its leaders now asked the Soviets to found a branch in Mahabad; they hoped thus to obtain a place to meet without attracting too much attention. The Soviets readily complied, and it was founded, not as a branch of the Iranian-Soviet Relations Society, but as the "Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society" (Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-Shuravi). The clubhouse was soon crowded with Kurds, who showed their gratitude to their new patrons by sending ten cases of cigarettes made of Kurdish tobacco to the victors of Leningrad.

• 186 536 668 It was at a ceremony in the society's clubhouse, in April 1945, that the Komala finally came into the open. The Soviet Consul from Rezaieh and the chief of VOKS in Azerbaijan were honored guests. The main feature of the program was an "opera" in which a woman called "Daik Nishteman" (Mother Native Land) was represented as abused by three ruffians, "Iraq," "Iran," and "Turkey," finally to be rescued by her stalwart sons. The audience, unused to dramatic representations, was deeply moved, and blood-feuds generations old were composed as life-long enemies fell weeping on each other's shoulders and swore to avenge Kurdistan.

177 622 668 At this ceremony the future head of the Kurdish state, Qazi Mohammad, was finally admitted to the party, to the gratification of the Soviets, who had not liked the democratic organization of the Komala and had long been looking for someone on whom they could count to lead it according to their suggestions. At first the Soviets, realizing the strength of the tribes, had approached tribal chiefs with requests to lead the nationalist movement. But only three of them commanded sufficient prestige for the task — Qaranei Agha Rais-ol-Ashair, venerable chief of the Mamesh and the acknowledged leader of the federation of which they were a part; Amr Khan Sharifi, chief of the Shikak and "grand old man" of Kurdistan; and Amir Asad of the Dehbokri, die-hard

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The Kurds of western Azerbaijan — which includes Mahabad — could hardly have been expected to join a party purportedly dedicated to Azerbaijani Turkish nationalism, so a new party had to be formed to fit them into the Soviet scheme. On September 12, Captain Namazaliev, Soviet Town Commandant in Miandoab, summoned the chiefs of the important Kurdish tribes, together with Qazi Mohammad and Seif Qazi, to Tabriz ostensibly to see the Soviet Consul. When they arrived, the bewildered Kurds were suddenly told to proceed to the railway station, where they were hustled onto a train and taken to Baku. For three days they lived in a villa outside the town and were entertained with tours, the theater, and the opera. On the fourth day they were ushered in to see Bagherov, President of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., who harangued them regarding the wrongs they had suffered under Reza Shah, and said that the Soviet Government would help the new Democrat Party, which was dedicated to freedom for the oppressed and which he strongly urged them to join. He condemned both the Tudeh Party, which he characterized as a group of ineffective trouble-makers, and the Komala, which he said was started in Iraq under the auspices of British intelligence and was nothing but an instrument of British imperialism. Then, after a warning not to say anything about the trip, the Kurds were put on the train to Tabriz, where they were loaded into Red Army vehicles and driven off to their homes.

THE DEMOCRAT PARTY OF KURDISTAN

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The results of the expedition were soon apparent. Shortly after his return, Qazi Mohammad called a meeting of Kurdish notables to announce the formation of the Democrat Party of Kurdistan, which he urged all to join. Concluding from its name that the goal of the party was democracy on the American model, many responded enthusiastically. A manifesto, signed by Qazi Mohammad and 105 leading Kurds, was issued; it stated that the Kurdish people now wished "to take advantage of the liberation of the world from Fascism and to share in the promises of the Atlantic Charter." The declaration said that the Kurds wished nothing but the human and constitutional rights denied them by Reza Shah, and listed their aims as follows:

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668 1. The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State.

• 186 2. The Kurdish language should be used in education and be the official language in administrative affairs.

3. The provincial council of Kurdistan should be immediately elected according to constitutional law and should supervise and inspect all state and social matters.

4. All state officials must be of local origin.

5. A single law for both peasants and notables should be adopted and the future of both secured.

6. The Kurdish Democrat Party will make a special effort to establish unity and complete fraternity with the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle.

7. The Kurdish Democrat Party will strive for the improvement of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people through the exploration of Kurdistan's many natural resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and the development of hygiene and education.

8. We desire that the peoples living in Iran be able to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their country.

The manifesto ended in Soviet style with the words, "Long Live Kurdish Democratic Autonomy!"

668 The formation of the new party resulted in the dissolution of the Komala and the absorption of its members by the Democrats. Yet from the beginning the tribal chiefs, fearful of communism, were wary of the new party, though many signed a pledge of support presented them by a Soviet political officer touring the tribal areas. This underlying tribal opposition would have made Qazi Mohammad's position untenable had it not been for a fortuitous accession of strength which arrived from Iraq — Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis.

668 The Barzanis had been even in Ottoman times one of the most troublesome of all the Kurdish tribes. In the 1920's Sheikh Ahmad
619 of Barzan, considered a god by the Barzanis and neighboring tribes, frequently rebelled against the British, who several times were forced to call in the R.A.F. Finally Sheikh Ahmad, his younger brother Mulla Mustafa, and his principal followers were exiled, first in southern Iraq, then in Suleimania. On June 11, 1942, Mulla Mustafa, who had taken over the leadership from his brother, escaped to Barzan.

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668 The Kurds were repulsed, however, in an attack on the Mah-
721 mudabad Pass near Saqqiz, designed to cut the Semandaj Road, and again later after they had seized the hills overlooking Saqqiz. The Iranian army drove them off and erected round watch-towers of mud on the summits, each manned by thirty or forty soldiers. Finally a truce was effected whereby liaison officers were exchanged,[1] each side was to stay within its lines, and the Kurds were to have the right to inspect vehicles going from Saqqiz to Baneh and Sardasht and so stop arms and ammunition from reaching the Iranian garrisons there. The Shikak and the Herki returned to the north.

CHARACTER OF QAZI MOHAMMAD AND THE KURDISH REPUBLIC

• 186 After this period of conflict, Qazi Mohammad drew aside his
609 iron curtain and gave non-Soviet observers a chance to look at his country. Although feeling against the British on account of the expulsion of the Barzanis from Iraq, Soviet-sponsored anti-British propaganda, and certain events in the past in which the Kurds considered they had been victims of British opportunism, was too strong to permit them to visit the tiny Kurdish Republic, at various times four Americans and one Frenchman were guests of Qazi Mohammad.

These observers found the Kurdish Republic to be a going con-
642 cern. Although destitute of any legal basis whatsoever, Qazi
621 Mohammad's *de facto* government continued as before, changing only the title of its ministers from *wazir* (minister) to *rais* (chief).
624 Qazi Mohammad himself became merely the leader of the party (Pishwa-i-Hizb-i-Dimokrat-i-Kurd). The villages were run by their old landlords and tribal leaders with the aid of a gendarmerie locally recruited and dressed in Kurdish costume, but commanded by officers from Mahabad with Soviet uniforms. Mahabad itself, from a typically drab Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and colorful, its streets thronging with Kurds in national costume, free for the moment of the hated Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.

[1] The Kurdish liaison officer was "Colonel" Mohammad Hassanzadeh, one of the original founders of the Komala, later killed when the Iranian army plane in which he was travelling crashed near Rasht.

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Those who had an opportunity to meet Qazi Mohammad could
622 not fail to be impressed with his personality, and easily under-
159 stood how he had become a symbol for Kurdish nationalists
829 everywhere. A short man of fifty, dressed in an old army overcoat,
173 he had a lightly bearded, ascetic face, slightly yellowish in complexion from a stomach complaint. He neither smoked nor drank and ate very little. His voice was gentle and well-modulated, his gestures quiet but effective. Something of an internationalist, he was interested in all the peoples of the world and knew many languages, including Russian, a little English, and Esperanto. His desk was customarily littered with grammars and readers and literary works in foreign tongues.

He seemed to be a man of deep convictions, backed with a rare courage and self-sacrifice, but tempered with broad-mindedness and moderation. During the period in question, at least, his demands were moderate: Kurdish autonomy within the Iranian state. He professed to share the view of many Kurds that since they were members of the same Iranian racial family as the Persians proper, there was no reason why they could not form the same combination as did the ancient Medes and Persians. Qazi himself thought the Kurds were the descendants of the Medes, and liked to give his own etymology of Mahabad — "abode of the Medes."

Yet it would be impossible to deny that he and his followers
• 196 also held pan-Kurdish aspirations and hoped to make Mahabad
448 the center of Kurdish culture and the Kurdish nationalist move-
871 ment, replacing Syria and Sulaimania, its centers at the present time. Great efforts were being made to put Kurdish education on a sound footing. At first Kurdish teachers had to translate from Persian textbooks orally in the classroom, but shortly before the fall of the Kurdish Republic, textbooks in Kurdish had been printed for the primary grades. In addition to a newspaper and a
209 political monthly periodical, both called *Kurdistan*, there were
186 published two primarily literary magazines, *Hawar* and *Hilal*.* All of these were printed on a press presented by the Red Army to

* A number of other Kurdish periodicals had been published during the Kurdish period, such as *Kurdish* and monthly *Kurdistan*, official organ of the party, which bore a picture of Stalin on the cover and contained in long or well as Iran.

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the Democrat Party of Kurdistan. The importance Qazi Mohammad attached to literature and the Kurdish language may be adduced from the presence on his staff of two young poets, Hazhar and Hiemen, whose poems were published in spite of the paper shortage.

Although these efforts did not suffice during the republic's short life to bring it anywhere near the standard of the other two centers of Kurdish culture where Kurdish has been freely written and taught for twenty-five years, politically at least Mahabad was the focal point toward which all Kurdish eyes now were turned. In intellectual Kurdish circles in Beirut, Istanbul, and Baghdad, as well as among the wild mountains of western Asia, all were watching to see whether Qazi Mohammad would succeed or fail. Couriers brought communications to him from groups of Kurds not only in Iraq but in Syria and Turkey as well. His movement appealed especially to the young people, who felt that the older nationalist parties had not accomplished much. In Iraq, for instance, a new secret party, the leftist "Ruzgari," was formed of these elements.

ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT

The old nationalist parties, the Hewa in Iraq and the Khoybun in Syria, were not enthusiastic about Qazi Mohammad because of his Soviet connections. Fear and even hatred of the Soviets among the Kurds is strong for several reasons. In the first place, most Kurds are deeply religious and remain distrustful of the Soviet attitude toward religion. Furthermore, many of them have met refugees fresh from the Soviet Union or have talked to Moslems in the Red Army, few of whom paint a rosy picture of the lot of Oriental peoples under Soviet rule. It must also be remembered that the Russians have been traditional enemies of the Kurds since the days of the Tsars. Russian troops in World War I fought over a large part of Kurdistan, leaving a trail of ruin and depopulation still traceable in many Kurdish valleys and villages. In Mahabad itself, Russian troops had been under orders for several days to shoot anyone appearing in the streets, and the town was looted and burned. None of this has been erased from the long oriental memories of the Kurds, who still frighten their crying

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177 children into silence by threatening them with the word "Russian."
186 The Soviets tried hard to counteract this unreceptive attitude.
668 They played up "Kurdish autonomy" in the Soviet Union, and the brave deeds of one Samand Siamandov, Red Army colonel of Kurdish origin, "Hero of Leningrad." How much success they had is hard to judge, but certainly large sections of the population, as well as landlords, merchants, and religious leaders, continued to distrust them and to extend this distrust to Qazi Mohammad, whose connection with the Soviets was undeniable. The walls of the building in which his government was housed were plastered solidly with Soviet propaganda posters; his newspapers and magazines contained a large proportion of Soviet material translated word for word into Kurdish; and his poets composed panegyrics to Stalin and the Red Army.

Yet in contrast to the rest of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan was to outside appearances free of Soviet agents. Aside from a few Iransovtrans truck drivers, who acted as observers for the Soviet and pro-Soviet governments, Soviet citizens were almost unknown in the area and Soviet agents kept under cover. There was said to be a Soviet representative in residence in Mahabad, though his presence was denied by Kurdish authorities.[11] Hashumov, Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, and his assistant Aliakbarov made occasional trips to Mahabad.

641 While terrorism reigned unchecked in eastern Azerbaijan, in
661 Kurdistan there were few if any political prisoners and only one or two cases of what may have been political assassination, though a number of Kurds not in sympathy with the regime did flee to Tehran. In the streets of Mahabad one could hear radio broadcasts from Ankara or London, while in Tabriz to listen to these brought the death penalty. Whether the reason for this freedom was the moderation and liberalism of Qazi and his cabinet, or the presence of the tribes who would not tolerate violent action against persons connected with them, the net result was to make the regime popular at least among the citizens of Mahabad, who enjoyed their respite from the exactions and oppression they

[11] The last of these Soviet advisers, one Amdov, is said to have been in Mahabad until the last days of the republic, when he fled to the Soviet Consulate in Tabriz.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

of its return. When the Kurds no longer hoped for this, and the Iranians no longer feared it, there was no chance for Qazi Mohammad's movement to survive.

The whole episode was a serious blow to the development of Kurdish nationalism. There is now no Komala and no Democrat Party of Kurdistan, and many of the potential leaders of the Kurds are dead, in prison, or in exile. Yet this does not mean that Kurdish nationalism is finished. The Kurdish Republic found its support among those progressive elements of the population which seem bound to increase in numbers and importance, and was opposed by those elements which seem destined to disappear. It remains to be seen whether Kurdish nationalism is practical in an area where, until recently, nationalism was an unknown conception and men still give primary allegiance to their religious and tribal chiefs. The Kurds have never been combined in a stable state of their own and enjoy no ancient unifying culture. Separated from each other by mountain barriers, they have always had to look for their cultural and economic needs to the capitals of the different states in which they have lived.

If the states the Kurds inhabit allow their Kurdish populations a degree of local autonomy and give up the attempt to force an alien nationalism upon them, they may succeed in obtaining a loyalty similar to that found in Switzerland with its multinational population. The Arab countries have made a start in this direction. A similar policy in Iran, if left free of foreign penetration, might be a cause of closer unity rather than of separatism between two of the nation's peoples.

habitat. Voices developed to shout from peak to peak across intervening valleys acquire inflexions to accentuate or suppress the echo of certain sounds, which can never be imitated by the plainsman.

There are about half a million Kurds in Iraq, a figure which represents only a fraction of the race; Turkey holds some three million and Iran at least one million. In the last-named country a reliable estimate is difficult to obtain owing to the widely separated areas reached by wandering tribes. Apart from those in the north-west, the mountainous country on the western border is peopled by Kurds as far south as Luristan. The north-eastern province of Khorasan also holds some Kurdish tribes; while certain tribes in Baluchistan may also be of Kurdish origin.

From the time when groups of Aryan-speaking families settled in secluded valleys until the present century, Kurdish tribes were cut off from each other and from the outside world by their mountains and by the fighting spirit of their primeval ancestors, who each regarded his own particular valley as his home, and any newcomer as an enemy who must be killed before he himself was overwhelmed. When man began to keep flocks and herds for domestic uses, the tribal exclusiveness was exaggerated by the need to prevent outsiders from sharing the limited areas of good grazing available among the rocky hills.

Intermarriage within the tribe has enhanced physical resemblances to such an extent that in many cases it is possible to distinguish a man's origin by his face as well as by the way he wears his headgear and his dialect. But there is no sign of this close blood-relationship having caused physical degeneration. The Kurd has been truly described as having the highest physical development of any race in the Middle East.

I have on occasion been out shooting with a Kurdish chief on the wrong side of seventy years of age, who rode a horse and

181 ing to live by doing the same, so why should we do more?" is the gist of most replies. Some say: "Why don't you English come and show us how to?" . . . Foreign undertakings are, however, not encouraged in Iraq.

• 186 The greatest difficulty to be overcome by the Kurds before they can take their place in the modern world is lack of education—that is, education in the broad sense as well as book-learning. The majority of Kurds have never seen Baghdad, and those who have find in it many things which disappoint them on coming down from the pure air of their snow-capped mountains.

Although the young Kurd who has been to school wants to improve himself and his race, his ambitions are stifled by members of the older generation who see in the advancement of civilization a loss of their own power; therefore they keep to the fore the old motto of "not being cleverer than

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• 186 your fathers". It was this fear of loss of power which frustrated any attempts at progress in Kurdistan during the period of
000 the British mandate over Iraq. The men who could have helped their race to become civilized—the chiefs or 'aristocracy' —have preferred to retain their temporary local power to the detriment of the advancement of their race. As has happened in nearly every country except England, when feudalism has ceased to be useful its leaders have sunk with their system rather than be the founders of a new democratic order.

There is little doubt that if education goes forward in conjunction with a raising of the standard of living, the highland Kurds will exercise an ever increasing influence on the progress of the young Iraqi state; just as the Scots in Great Britain, since the days of Queen Anne, have quietly introduced their fertile brains into every phase and calling of the national life.

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21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
Kurd MAII

claim the right of wintering in the Christian villages of Armenia, and, as fanatical Moslems, they indulged on occasion in massacres of their unwilling Christian hosts—this often with the connivance or tacit approval of the Turks, who were not reluctant to see the Christian communities of Asia Minor decrease in numbers.

For obvious reasons, detailed figures as to the number of the Kurds are not available,[1] but estimates, some of them much out of date, give a total of some 3 millions, distributed as follows :

Turkey	1,250,000
Iraq (1924) . . .	494,000
Iran	700,000
Baluchistan . . .	350,000
Transcaucasian Russia (1911)	125,000
Syria	100,000
Afghanistan . . .	20,000

The Kurds cannot be said to have any advanced political feeling, and, even less than the Badawin Arabs, have rarely been able to combine for long in a stable, large-scale political organisation. Individualism and local tribal feeling are the chief characteristics. Kurdish political activity has been negative : that is, strongly against any other group that has tried to rule them, and their predilection tends to be anti-governmental, whatever the composition of the latter may be, rather than for pro-Kurdish aims. Since 1923 there have been ten serious revolts by the Kurds against various national governments—two against Turkey, four in Iran, and four in Iraq. One of these, in 1947, made use of weapons looted from Iranian military depots. Such revolts lend themselves to intervention by outside powers ; and an American view [2] is that a Kurdish revolt against Iran in 1942 had tacit support from Russia, with the aim of embarrassing the Iranian government. Little was finally achieved, however : one factor may have been the importance at the time of American lease-lend supplies to Russia, as the result of which the U.S. was able to exert some moderating influence on Russian policy.

Since 1927, a Kurdish independence movement, the 'Khoibun', has been in existence, but its activities have hitherto had little success, the main obstacle being jealousy, division, and lack of co-operation among the Kurds themselves. An attempt was made to enlist

[1] In modern Turkish statistics the Kurds are described as 'Mountain Turks'.
[2] That of Professor W. L. Westermann.

14: Ivanov E-5 (no date) 1926 MAI Iran MAI
Kurd MAII
Baluchi AA2

K 731 164 This division,[1] probably will not last long. The great famine and drought of 1916–1917 have greatly reduced the numbers of flocks, and the typhus and other epidemics have rendered many powerful tribes insignificant.

142 147 It is noticeable that a Khurasani Kurd differs in his physical structure from his kinsmen in the West, *i.e.* in the real Kurdistan, exactly as the Persian peasant of Khurasan differs from a western. The Khurasani Kurds are much taller and stronger, but their features are not so finely cut, and the facial angle is not as high as the one seen in the west. The Khurasani Kurds resemble Lurs more than the western Kurds in their physical type, although fair-haired individuals are much rarer amongst them.* They are a comparatively healthy race except in the vicinity of cities, where disease and opium smoking are frequent.

619 628 186 There is a great deal of unity between all these different tribes, and the feuds which are so common in Kurdistan proper apparently do not exist. Like all nomads, Kurds possess a greater national feeling than the settled Persians. There are apparently no great differences between the local idioms, and intercourse between tribes is very common; even intermarriage is very frequent.

197 191 The language of the Khurasani Kurds belongs to the so-called Northern or the real Kurdish family, and is connected with the dialect of the Mukris more than with any other known idiom. It has, however, several discrepancies from that original tongue. The Khurasani Kurdish is greatly influenced by the laws of the Khurasani Persian phonology. The vocabulary varies very much in different localities, and is either replete with Persian terms in the south, or with Turkish in the north. Many Kurdish families are bilingual, especially in the north, where they often speak better Turkish than Kurdish.

B 221 177 162 197 I 162 563 *Baluchis.*—This is another important tribe of Iranian origin living in Khurasan. They are nomads. Very rarely isolated families become settled, but in one or two generations they lose all connection with the Baluchis and become assimilated with the Persians. The Baluchis who extend their wanderings far to the north, live in the districts of Juwain, Nishapur, Turshiz, etc., and have already lost their original language. Further south their idiom resembles the original tongue, *i.e.* the Makrani dialect of Baluchi. Very little exact information about their language and folk-lore is available at present.

B 142 157 Physically Baluchis differ considerably from Persians and Kurds. They are usually much smaller, their features are not so regular, and their facial angle is often very sharp. They are an unsightly, lazy, apathetic people, although they possess much predatory spirit. Their seasonal

† [between nomadic and sedentary way of life. – Analyst]

K 142 302 * The impression concerning this may not be correct, because the adults dye their hair with henna and always keep the head covered. But it seems that in Kurdistan proper one sees more numerous fair-haired children than in Khurasan; in the West they may be mistaken for Europeans.